[WG-UMA] [WG-IDAssurance] [WG-P3] Trust Federation Frameworks andAssurance Metrics

j stollman stollman.j at gmail.com
Sun May 15 08:09:43 EDT 2011


Rainer, et al,

I have been inspired to devote a bit more time to this by your note.

First, I am inspired by two key points made in your opening:  the separation
of identity from authentication and the specification of "session
protection."  As we all know, the current NIST Levels of Assurance combine
Identity and Authentication.  This has always made me uncomfortable because
the two concepts are so distinct.  Of course, they know this; they just
wanted to get to a single metric.
In my own model, I have expanded "session protection" to "environment."
This expansion allows coverage not only of endpoint and network security and
integrity in an electronic transaction, but can also be applied to
face-to-face transactions.  For example, you and I might agree that I will
pay you $10000 for a ruby you own, but we may be unwilling to conduct such a
transaction in a public place in a bad neighborhood.

Second, I favor your idea of providing both summary metrics and detailed
backup material for those who desire to apply different weights to the
evaluation criteria.  Critical to the summary metrics would be a lengthy
discussion of how/why the weightings were chosen.  While this would
necessarily be somewhat lengthy, it would only need to be read once and
could be applied to large groups of related transactions.
I also agree with Ken that even with this simplification, I doubt we will
get to a single number.  It is too pedagogical.  Like Stiftung Warentest,
Consumer Reports in North America (ConsumerReports.org) uses this approach.
But they may use 4-10 scores to rate different types of products.  They then
give a prioritized listing of products, but never refine their ratings to a
single number.  The population's tastes are too varied to apply a single
prescription.

I would take a slightly different perspective to Anna's comment, "Privacy
... is usually more important to the data subject."  I am not sure that this
is quite accurate.  The typical issue is that the data subject has more
information "at risk" than do the other parties.  In large part, this is
because the other parties typically control the transaction.  Frequently, I
am intrigued by an offer I receive, but seek more information on the
offeror. But, in the one-way direction of control of typical transactions, I
am unable to obtain more information.  My only choice is to transact or not.

A agree with Anna's contention that different weights are likely to apply to
different those in different roles in a transaction.  The number of roles
required to conduct the broad range of transactions within the scope of
federated trust frameworks continues to grow.  And as it grows, the number
of perspectives expands also.

It if for this reason, that I continue to focus on the alternative model for
Trust Frameworks that I proposed back in March.  The current model is based
on roles.  I proposed a model based on trust relationships.  Ultimately, I
am just transposing rows and columns in a matrix of roles versus trust
relationships.  I contend that there is a fixed and manageable number of
trust vectors that exist between any two parties -- regardless of their
role.  (Though, I also agree the the weighting will change depending on the
role of the party or the environment of the transaction.  I.e., though I
trust my best friend to look out for my interests, I may not trust him to do
so if his life is being threatened.)

In my previous proposal I suggested that there need to be at least four
trust relationships:  Identity, Terms, Subsidiary Rights, and Enforcement.
Based on this thread, I have added Environment to include both session
integrity as well as such factors such as having one's actions compromised
by threats or pressure.

In this model, all transactions are 1:1.  A particular transaction (e..g,
buying a widget from an online vendor) may require multiple 1:1 component
transactions (between subject and vendor, between subject and credit card
company, between credit card company and vendor, etc.).  Each transaction
still has the same complexity (i.e. number of cells in the matrix).  But
each transaction can be evaluated using the same criteria (though the
weightings applied may well change for each role pairing).  The
simplification this model brings is that only five scores need to be created
that can then be re-weighted as needed for each component transaction.

Jeff

On Fri, May 13, 2011 at 11:13 AM, Faut, Nathan E <nfaut at kpmg.com> wrote:

> All –
>
>
>
> I am sure some of you have seen this, and some may have not.  The following
> white paper was written for a conference for a predecessor to Kantara.  I
> think it has some strong bearing on this discussion.  Please pass it along
> to any and all interested parties.
>
>
>
> The authors welcome any interest!
>
>
>
> -Nathan
> =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
> Nathan Faut
>
> 1676 International Drive
>
> Suite 1200
> Mclean, VA 22102
>
> office: 703-286-6883
>
> at PBGC: 202-326-4000 ext. 3845
>
> mobile: 301-335-2656
>
> FAX: 202-403-3126
>
>
>
> *From:* Colin Wallis [mailto:colin_wallis at hotmail.com]
> *Sent:* Thursday, May 12, 2011 3:27 AM
> *To:* Rainer Hoerbe; wg-tfmm at kantarainitiative.org
> *Cc:* wg-uma at kantarainitiative.org; wg-idassurance at kantarainitiative.org;
> Kantara P3 WG
> *Subject:* Re: [WG-IDAssurance] [WG-P3] Trust Federation Frameworks
> andAssurance Metrics
>
>
>
>
> <<Further aspects: When controls are implemented to fulfill a protection
> requirement the controls can be measures along 3 generic vectors:
> a) Relative virtue compared to the state of the art (e.g. optional data
> minimization is weaker than a mandatory one)
> b) Strength of enforcement (contractual, by law, technically, with or
> without audit, ..)
> c) Capability maturity of the asserting actor (ad hoc, controlled,
> improving processes)>>
>
> Yes, I like this approqach.
> It is similar to the approach that the CSA is proposing for assuring cloud
> providers in terms of ISO 27001 compliance.
> Sure, the control set is complex there, but they do offer a summary matrix,
> which is closer to Rainer's view for end user/consumer/SOHO folks as he
> described above.
>
> Cheers
> Colin
>
> ------------------------------
>
> From: rainer at hoerbe.at
> Date: Thu, 12 May 2011 00:14:57 +0200
> To: wg-tfmm at kantarainitiative.org
> CC: wg-uma at kantarainitiative.org; wg-idassurance at kantarainitiative.org;
> wg-p3 at kantarainitiative.org
> Subject: [WG-P3] Trust Federation Frameworks and Assurance Metrics
>
> We discussed how to use Assurance Levels several times in the last months,
> most recently on* [WG-P3] Anna Slomovic's Follow up thread (RE: IAWG P3
> Agendas going into Berlin)* around May 9. I think that we need a clear
> model of assurance metrics to proceed on this topic and would like
> to outline some thoughts on such a model:
>
> The positions are that Levels of Assurance (of identity, authentication,
> privacy, user control, session protection, service level etc.) shall be
> simple to use and provide comprehensive information on the safeguards that
> the assuring actor implemented to satisfy the relying actor. These
> two requirements are obviously in opposition. Simple use is afforded with a
> single scale (like 1-4), whereas a comprehensive policy is more like the
> SAML Authentication Context with 50 elements, end even that does not cover
> all areas.
>
> What are the basic requirements?
> Assurance metrics provide the relying actor with the assurance that its
> protection requirements are fulfilled with a mutually understood minimum
> quality level. The assurance has to be communicated in a structured form
> with some granularity. The key question is the granularity. Do we have to
> provide a fat list in the size of the ISO 27002 paper, or a single number
> that covers everything from information security to privacy?
>
> I suggest taking the field of consumer reports as a reference. If Stiftung
> Warentest (the main tester in Europe) compares products or services, the do
> that in roughly 4 steps:
>
> a) Description of the subject field in general, with the key expectations
> and state-of-the-art solutions, plus lessons learned from former tests.
> Rationale why the subject field was limited to a certain range of products.
>
> b) Product by product textual review highlighting special features that
> would not be easily conveyed in a formally structured table.
> c) Structured comparison as a large table containing the relevant
> properties.
> d) Summary rating according to some predefined weighting scheme.
>
> Assuming that a test would compare digital cameras, one could study the
> comparison in detail to come to informed decision, applying different
> weights to usability, durability, picture quality, zoom range etc. Or one
> could use the score “very good” printed on the box when purchasing a camera
> ad hoc, without unbiased consulting at hand.
>
> I derive from consumer reports that both approaches are meaningful and two
> audiences should be addressed. An enterprise risk manager would most
> probably see a detailed set of assurances to protect valuable assets,
> whereas a typical SOHO user would like to get away with a 3 second attention
> span on the security and privacy topic and would therefore be served better
> with a simple scale.
>
> To achieve interoperability most controls are already aggregated, mixing
> apples and oranges. Take the well-known encryption strength: Looking at
> Ecrypt’s yearly report on key sizes on learns quickly, that the “128 bit
> equivalent” in composed of symmetric and asymmetric key lengths, hash
> functions, padding, protection duration and more. The same is true for many
> other controls. It will be the challenge of each trust framework to find the
> adequate level of granularity for each control, which balances control with
> flexibility and interoperability.
>
> Further aspects: When controls are implemented to fulfill a protection
> requirement the controls can be measures along 3 generic vectors:
> a) Relative virtue compared to the state of the art (e.g. optional data
> minimization is weaker than a mandatory one)
> b) Strength of enforcement (contractual, by law, technically, with or
> without audit, ..)
> c) Capability maturity of the asserting actor (ad hoc, controlled,
> improving processes)
>
> I would like to describe such a model in the TFMM if your feedback is
> agreeable :-)
>
>
>
> - Rainer
>
>
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-- 
Jeff Stollman
stollman.j at gmail.com
1 202.683.8699
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