[Wg-p3] Prep For Privacy Workshop in Washington DC - August 10

Bob Pinheiro kantara at bobpinheiro.com
Thu Aug 6 07:48:06 PDT 2009


Brett McDowell wrote:
> I am seeing a few topics emerge from this discussion that I'll summarize:
>
> - are all the major protocols properly represented, especially 
> regarding privacy features?
> - should the Open Government initiative(s) require 
> better-than-passwords for any app collecting PII?
I think the question is, Should the Open Government initiatives require 
better-than-password authentication of consumers/citizens by Identity 
Providers when fraudulent access to certain eGov applications could 
potentially cause "moderate" harm to the consumer/citizen whose identity 
was "stolen?"  Are there such eGov applications?  And if so, who is 
going to do the work to help ensure that consumer/citizens have these 
credentials and know how to use them, and that use of such credentials 
won't cause the citizen's/consumer's privacy to be compromised? 
> - what's the motivation of the event in the first place? (I can't 
> answer that one, you'd have to ask the organizers)
>
> What I see is a blending of issues that will be discussed Monday:
> - technology choice, and it's interoperability, privacy, and security 
> characteristics
> - assurance frameworks: how can a Gov app trust a non-Gov assertion (a 
> la the IAF)
> - privacy policy issues: what is the privacy impact for Americans 
> using Open Gov/eGov apps via their person-life credentials?
>
> Does anyone else see another way to summarize or frame this 
> discussion?  I'm looking for a framing because I'm hoping we can 
> quickly conclude and provide me with guidance/message to take to Monday.
>
> Brett McDowell  |  +1.413.652.1248  |  http://KantaraInitiative.org
>
> On Aug 5, 2009, at 12:23 AM, Bob Pinheiro wrote:
>
>> I believe that one of the motivators behind these eGov efforts was 
>> the desire to make government services more available to ordinary 
>> citizens.  For instance, this could include allowing citizens to 
>> access the Social Security Administration's website (in the US) for 
>> the purpose of changing beneficiary information, or a mailing 
>> address.   In my view, there is a privacy issue if an imposter or 
>> other unauthorized individual is somehow able to access these 
>> applications due to any type of security failure.  Similar privacy 
>> issues can arise in other non-eGov applications as well.  For 
>> instance, there is a big push (in the US) to create electronic 
>> medical records.  A privacy issue exists if someone is able to gain 
>> unauthorized access to someone else's electronic health records.
>>
>> One type of  "security failure" that could lead to these privacy 
>> problems is the failure of policy makers to require adequate 
>> authentication for access to these applications.  Of course, it's 
>> open to debate as to what type of authentication should be required 
>> for accessing these eGov and health applications.  Such debates would 
>> likely involve some value judgements to be made about the degree of 
>> harm that would come to an individual if someone could break into 
>> his/her SSA account and change a mailing address or beneficiary.  Or 
>> if someone else could access their online health records.
>>
>> At least as far as I can tell, the types of eGov applications that 
>> might involve individual citizens or consumers, as well as those 
>> involving consumer online health records such as Google Health and 
>> Microsoft's HealthVault, currently require only a static password for 
>> access.  So according to NIST 800-63 as well as the Trust Framework 
>> Provider Adoption Process document, these are essentially Assurance 
>> Level 2 applications.  OMB-0404 defines the types of risks associated 
>> with the four Assurance Levels.  At AL-2, there is only a "low" risk 
>> of harm due to unauthorized release of sensitive personal 
>> information, whereas at AL-3 the risk of harm is deemed to be "moderate."
>>
>> It shouldn't be very hard to argue that unauthorized access to eGov 
>> applications such as Social Security, or access to online health 
>> records,  may incur at least a "moderate" risk of harm to 
>> individuals. So I'd propose that authentication for these 
>> applications ought to be AL-3.  However, I suspect that the people 
>> who setup these eGov and online health databases didn't decide to 
>> choose password-only authentication because they first decided that 
>> there was only a "low" risk of harm to individuals.  The more likely 
>> reason is that there really is no alternative today for 
>> authentication of the masses.......people just don't have personal 
>> certificates or one-time password tokens, so the default is to use 
>> passwords.
>>
>> Now everyone knows that using only passwords for protecting sensitive 
>> online resources and personal information is just not a good idea.  
>> Even if you aren't tricked by a phishing email, there's always 
>> malware, social engineering, and brute force methods to get at these 
>> passwords.  So now we have these new technologies and protocols such 
>> as SAML, OpenID, and Information Cards.  Will using these help to 
>> increase security and reduce privacy risks?  People speak of 
>> "SAML-based authentication", but SAML is just a way to secure the 
>> movement of identity information across boundaries, from an identity 
>> provider to a relying party.  You could use only passwords for 
>> authentication at an identity provider, and still use SAML for 
>> identity assertions to the relying party.  So whether we are talking 
>> about SAML, OpenID, or Information Cards, there still needs to be an 
>> authentication mechanism that's stronger than using just passwords.  
>> Some OpenID providers allow authentication via one-time passwords or 
>> browser certificates, but most just rely on passwords.  The 
>> Information Card protocols allow several ways for a user/consumer to 
>> authenticate to the identity provider, including PKI certificates.  
>> But still, Information Card deployments still seem to rely on only 
>> passwords for this authentication step. This seems especially 
>> dangerous when Information Cards reside in cloud-based selectors, 
>> since anyone who can successfully authenticate to the selector can 
>> then use the Information Card.  
>>
>> Since this WG is concerned not only with privacy but with public 
>> policy, I'd propose that Kantara (by means of this WG as well as the 
>> Consumer Identity WG) at least consider taking the following stands:
>>
>>     * That online eGov applications used by consumers, and other
>>       applications that involve sensitive personal information
>>       accessed by consumers (such as online health records), move
>>       away from authentication based on passwords only, and adopt
>>       stronger authentication methods.  Since the Assurance Level is
>>       dependent on the potential harm that might befall consumers who
>>       can be successfully impersonated online by a fraudster, it may
>>       first be necessary to make some statements concerning these
>>       levels of risk for various kinds of consumer eGov and other
>>       applications.   [Of course, Asssurance Level is also determined
>>       by other things such as how identity proofing is done, etc, but
>>       these are a bit removed from the point I'm trying to
>>       make.....that weak authentication is not good enough for
>>       protecting sensitive consumer eGov, health, and other
>>       apps....and that weak authentication leads to privacy violations]
>>
>>     * That new identity management schemes such as OpenID and
>>       Information Cards adopt stronger authentication mechanisms such
>>       as X.509 certificates or one-time passwords for authentication
>>       of the consumer to the identity provider, instead of basing
>>       this authentication on passwords only.
>>
>>
>> Bob
>> ---------------------------
>> Bob Pinheiro
>> Chair, Consumer Identity WG
>> 908-654-1939
>> kantara at bobpinheiro.com
>> www.bobpinheiro.com
>>
>>
>>
>> Brett McDowell wrote:
>>> I believe you should all also be subscribed to the community@ list, 
>>> so apology for the forward.  But I thought this WG might want to 
>>> deep-dive a bit more than the community@ list will so kicking off a 
>>> fresh thread.
>>>
>>> If you look closely at this agenda you'll see I'm on it.  I'd like 
>>> to as the P3WG for advice for how to position the privacy issues as 
>>> they relate to the Open Government topic, especially (but not 
>>> exclusively) in the US.  The context for this event is the US 
>>> Government evaluating the acceptance of more identity protocols to 
>>> expand the user-base of eGov applications.  The US Government has 
>>> been accepting X.509 PKI for awhile now, and SAML 2.0.  Now they are 
>>> looking on OpenID and Information Cards technology.  There are 
>>> issues in the background about how does any "credential 
>>> provider/identity provider" prove they meet the Level of Assurance 
>>> requirements of the US Government, but that's not the focus of 
>>> Monday's event.  Monday's event seems to be more focused on the 
>>> privacy impact of these new technologies (and I think pure PKI and 
>>> SAML might get re-visited as well).
>>>
>>> With that... anyone have any comments or suggestions as I prepare my 
>>> notes for the workshop?
>>>
>>> Thanks in advance!
>>>
>>> Brett McDowell  |  +1.413.652.1248  |  http://KantaraInitiative.org
>>>
>>> Begin forwarded message:
>>>
>>>> *From: *"J. Trent Adams" <jtrentadams at gmail.com 
>>>> <mailto:jtrentadams at gmail.com>>
>>>> *Date: *August 4, 2009 7:14:04 AM EDT
>>>> *To: *community at kantarainitiative.org 
>>>> <mailto:community at kantarainitiative.org>
>>>> *Subject: **[Community] Privacy Workshop in Washington DC - August 10*
>>>>
>>>> All -
>>>>
>>>> In case you're interested in what the OpenID and InfoCard crew have 
>>>> been
>>>> up to for the past few months, now's your chance to find out. 
>>>>  Check out
>>>> the Privacy Workshop in Washington DC on August 10th.
>>>>
>>>> http://www.idmanagement.gov/drilldown.cfm?action=privacy_workshop
>>>>
>>>> The meeting will present the work that's been done so far, and solicit
>>>> questions and comments from the wider community.  Remember to register
>>>> as space is limited.
>>>>
>>>> - Trent
>>>>
>>>> -----
>>>>
>>>> Open Government Identity Management Solutions Privacy Workshop, August
>>>> 10, 2009
>>>>
>>>> Location of the Workshop: The American Institute of Architects (AIA)
>>>> Building, The AIA Boardroom, 1735 New York Avenue, NW, Washington, 
>>>> DC 20006
>>>>
>>>> Agenda:
>>>>
>>>> 8:00 am Registration & check-in
>>>> 9:00 am Welcome & Overview of the Initiative
>>>>    Judith Spencer Co-Chair ICAMSC
>>>> 9:15 am White House Vision
>>>>    Vivek Kundra, Federal CIO
>>>> 9:45 am Technical Approach
>>>>    Chris Louden, Protiviti Government Services
>>>> 10:30 am Break
>>>> 10:45 am Open Trust Frameworks for Open Government
>>>>    Don Thibeau (OpenID),
>>>>    Drummond Reed (InfoCard),
>>>>    Bob Morgan (InCommon),
>>>>    Brett McDowell (Kantara)
>>>> 11:30 am Panel discussion - benefits of initiative
>>>>    Representatives of OpenID,
>>>>    InfoCard,
>>>>    InCommon,
>>>>    Kantara Initiative
>>>> 12:30 pm Lunch (on own)
>>>> 1:30 pm Federal Privacy Considerations
>>>>    CIO Privacy Committee Chair/designee
>>>> 2:00 pm Panel discussion/question & answer session
>>>>    Privacy protections of the schemes;
>>>>    representatives from OpenID,
>>>>    InfoCard,
>>>>    Kantara Initiative,
>>>>    InCommon,
>>>>    & Federal Government
>>>> 3:15 pm Wrap-up - where to go for more information
>>>>    Judith Spencer
>>>>
>>>> -----
>>>>
>>>> -- 
>>>> J. Trent Adams
>>>> =jtrentadams
>>>>
>>>> Profile: http://www.mediaslate.org/jtrentadams/
>>>> LinkedIN: http://www.linkedin.com/in/jtrentadams
>>>> Twitter: http://twitter.com/jtrentadams
>>>>
>>>>
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>>>
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
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>>
>>
>
 
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