[DG-BSC] Ann Vroom Followup toBSC telecon Thursday August 25 2016

Patrick Curry patrick.curry at bbfa.info
Sun Aug 28 06:34:55 CDT 2016


Hi All,

In the various EU industry & gov discussions, there has been some debate about the nature of block chains vs databases.  There’s a shrinking few folks claiming that BCs are just databases and that’s all there is to it.  But the consensus differs.

The three primary features of a distributed ledger enabled by a BC are:
It is peer-peer and updated by a consensual voting mechanism and with a set of strong cryptographic functions.  There is no centralised master database under control of a single organisation, which is the practical norm today.  
The distributed ledger technology (DLT) enables everyone to get to see the same information at the same time. 
It is tamperproof.
It is true that there are ways to attack a BC in theory but its peer-peer nature requires much coordinated action and collusion to attack a distributed mechanism.  There are ways to mitigate both threats and vulnerabilities.
In some circumstances, part of the BC could be replaced by other mechanisms, to enable much greater efficiency and higher levels of assurance.  Hence ongoing to work to start piloting a first BC where the Proof of Work is replaced by PKI federation. 
The complexity of today’s supply chains and business interactions means that BCs will need to federate in a number of cases, and the expectation is that a company in a major supply chains will need to interact with several BCs for different purposes.  However, the trust mechanisms and trusted attributes that underpin these BCs will need to be the same to minimise risk and cost, and also to avoid information and process fracture.  

Of courses, there are many situations where a database is just fine and there is not need for a BC.  However, where there is a cross-organisational requirement for an electronic distributed ledger that is distributed, fast, at scale, tamperproof, supports transparency, signing, authentication, access control and smart contracts, then a BC is the logical choice.   Hence the interest for supply chains, payments, asset tracking and major registers of authoritative data.

BCs depend on access control, particularly for high assurance, and hence demand for PKI federation is rising.  Colin Wallis and I will be participating in the Estonian gov supported Future of Identity meeting 1-3 Sep, which is looking at exploiting eResidency for several international uses, including supporting block chains.  The Estonian gov has had a blockchain supporting part of their X-Roads shared services for several years, provided by Guardtime.   

My intention is for KI to become involved in the assurance regimes for major cross-border DLTs and BCs.  Individual BC policy frameworks will be decided by the BC and constrained by the particularly BC technology being used.  KI could provide the collaborative assurance profiles and much more.    Colin is aware of this.  I hope it will be possible for this DG-BSC to engage on some of these emerging realities. 

regards,

Patrick  

Patrick Curry
Director

British Business Federation Authority - BBFA Ltd
M: +44 786 024 9074
T:   +44 1980 620606
patrick.curry at bbfa.info
www.bbfa.info – a not-for-profit, self-regulating body   



On 27 Aug 2016, at 21:09, Thorsten H. Niebuhr [WedaCon GmbH] <tniebuhr at wedacon.net> wrote:

Hi All,

Still trying to catch up all the great stuff you all did in the past weeks, and sorry for not taking part of it due to my vacation!

This comment from Jeff is the one which finally make me step in again:

Question: What is it, which can not be achieved because we do not have a blockchain (yet) ? In my eyes, the only thing which limits 'the digital world' is the current lack of (universal) trust.
Assuming we would have such a trustworthy (from all possible angles) instance right now: Which usecase can NOT be realized with current technology?


thx,


Thorsten


On 26.08.2016 19:32, j stollman wrote:
> All,
> It's been said that when you are keeping you head and everyone around you is losing theirs, maybe you don't understand the situation.
> So I'll allow that, perhaps, I am guilty of missing something important here.
> 
> I see this consent as an excellent demonstration of an UMA application, but I fail to understand the benefits of using blockchain.  Any database could track the consents.  And an SQL database could perform queries much faster and cheaper.  The only justification I can imagine for using blockchain would be if you could not find a trustworthy owner for the database.  In this instance, using a public blockchain would remove the fear that the database owner might be unscrupulous and try to modify the data to some advantage.  Other than that, I don't know why it would be beneficial to engage a blockchain network to perform this simple record keeping.
> 
> So what am I missing?
> 
> Thank you.
> 
> Jeff
> 
> 
> ---------------------------------
> Jeff Stollman
> stollman.j at gmail.com <mailto:stollman.j at gmail.com>
> +1 202.683.8699
> 
> 
> Truth never triumphs — its opponents just die out.
> Science advances one funeral at a time.
>                                     Max Planck
> 
> On Fri, Aug 26, 2016 at 12:50 PM, M AV <av_m at hotmail.com <mailto:av_m at hotmail.com>> wrote:
> Critiques coming in are great, thx – super advantage of cartoon-simple illustrations is that is spoofs out places where there’s fundamental lack of clarity or consensus on the basics of the proposed flow – deep details are eventually necessary, but at the brain-storming use case level a beehive of details can be more obfuscating than illuminative (excuse my mixed metaphors – obviously I’m a “visual” thinker …  so I always kind of push back for a “draw it” explanation and trimming the proffered flow idea down to it’s bare essentials .. J
> 
>  
> All that said – I think the concept of Alice co-owning the consent with the researcher(s) is one of the radical ideas here that could be facilitated in a new way by the new BC technology – i.e., the idea that Alice’s consent is an “asset” that she shares with the co-parties to the consent contract and which she therefore thereafter participates actively in vis-à-vis the addition of new co-parties, i.e., researchers using the asset – e.g. Alice’s data –
> 
>  
> My knowledge of research consents is not current enough (former JHMI administrator and then health care biz lawyer, but semi-retired now) to know whether a downstream researcher could piggy-back on to an existing consent asset (contract agreement), but I guess as long as we blue-sky use-case-ing we can assume anything arguendo J
> 
>  
> Best to all, ann v.
> 
>   <>
> From: James Hazard [mailto:james.g.hazard at gmail.com <mailto:james.g.hazard at gmail.com>] 
> Sent: Friday, August 26, 2016 12:11 PM
> To: John Moehrke <johnmoehrke at gmail.com <mailto:johnmoehrke at gmail.com>>
> Cc: M AV <av_m at hotmail.com <mailto:av_m at hotmail.com>>; dg-bsc at kantarainitiative.org <mailto:dg-bsc at kantarainitiative.org>
> 
> Subject: Re: [DG-BSC] Ann Vroom Followup toBSC telecon Thursday August 25 2016
>  
> Hi, 
> 
>  
> John and I discussed this a bit off channel (some issue re the mailing list), and I suggested that all use cases need to be accommodated.  The one that Ann posed makes sense in many contexts (for instance, I think it is like the use case for the GA4GH's ADAM consents - but giving Alice a direct role). 
> 
>  
> So I did a start on John's use case - of Alice offering the same materials - and present a base for negotiation of the conditions of the use, which can then take place as an exchange of records between Alice and Researcher B.  
> 
> http://www.commonaccord.org/index.php?action=doc&file=GH/KantaraInitiative/DG-BSC/Consent/Use2/01-Data.md <http://www.commonaccord.org/index.php?action=doc&file=GH/KantaraInitiative/DG-BSC/Consent/Use2/01-Data.md>
>  
> Maybe John can correct or round this out.
> 
>  
> Jim
> 
>   
>  
> On Fri, Aug 26, 2016 at 8:33 AM, John Moehrke <johnmoehrke at gmail.com <mailto:johnmoehrke at gmail.com>> wrote:
> 
> I don't think this flow is realistic. he second  researcher (B) would not likely be added to the existing consent, but rather build a new consent.
> 
>  
> An alternative flow :
> 
> Alice publishing her 'preferences' first, likely advertising specific health attributes to help researchers select. (blockchain publication, likely using Pseudonym)
> The researcher discovering Alice, and determines preferences meet the research terms. (possibly using smart-contracts)
> The researcher approaches Alice with the offer. (blockchain messaging)
> Note at this point, as JohnW diagram shows, there is usually some form of 'negotiation'. This might be simply Alice making selections (web form), or might be an interactive session using technology (Oauth/UMA), human interaction, or smart-contracts. This negotiation phase is to optimize the terms of the consent  (possibly through smart-contract).
> The terms of the interaction are fixed (likely published on blockchain) - possibly in smart-contract)
> The researcher accesses the data (with authorization from blockchain evidence, or other such as UMA)
> 
> In this flow, what you have diagrammed as a new researcher (B) is really a new opportunity -- starting at step 2. This would certainly be a new consent.
> 
>  
> I realize I might be bias, as this is the scenario that I diagrammed on my blog in May. But I still think it holds up, and would love to see it developed under kantara
> 
>   https://healthcaresecprivacy.blogspot.com/2016/05/healthcare-blockchain-big-data.html <https://healthcaresecprivacy.blogspot.com/2016/05/healthcare-blockchain-big-data.html>
>  
> John
> 
> 
> John Moehrke
> Principal Engineering Architect: Standards - Interoperability, Privacy, and Security
> CyberPrivacy – Enabling authorized communications while respecting Privacy
> M +1 920-564-2067 <tel:%2B1%20920-564-2067>
> JohnMoehrke at gmail.com <mailto:JohnMoehrke at gmail.com>
> https://www.linkedin.com/in/johnmoehrke <https://www.linkedin.com/in/johnmoehrke>
> https://healthcaresecprivacy.blogspot.com <https://healthcaresecprivacy.blogspot.com/>
> "Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?" ("Who watches the watchers?")
> 
>  
> On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 6:27 PM, James Hazard <james.g.hazard at gmail.com <mailto:james.g.hazard at gmail.com>> wrote:
> 
> Hi, 
> 
>  
> Here is a first, rough sketch.  There are five steps in the transaction.  It is structured to anticipate additional requests and grants.  05-AliceGrants, is the last link in the chain and gives an overview of the steps.  You could click on it, then on "Document".  Note that a few nuances have been captured, such as the request being more limited in scope than the full data.
> 
>  
> The general principle is that each step in a transaction that needs to be persisted is documented as a record.  The record states particulars and references its context, including the prior step.  
> 
>  
> In a production system, each record can be stored under a friendly name, like this, or under a hash.  Records can be stored in a file system versioned with git, like this, or in a database such as IPFS or a blockchain, as needed. 
> 
>  
> http://www.commonaccord.org/index.php?action=list&file=GH/KantaraInitiative/DG-BSC/Consent/Use1/ <http://www.commonaccord.org/index.php?action=list&file=GH/KantaraInitiative/DG-BSC/Consent/Use1/>
>     
>  
> On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 4:14 PM, M AV <av_m at hotmail.com <mailto:av_m at hotmail.com>> wrote:
> 
> It’s one .jpeg you should be able to cut and paste from the email …
> 
>   <>
> From: James Hazard [mailto:james.g.hazard at gmail.com <mailto:james.g.hazard at gmail.com>] 
> Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2016 4:13 PM
> To: M AV <av_m at hotmail.com <mailto:av_m at hotmail.com>>
> Cc: Eve Maler <eve.maler at forgerock.com <mailto:eve.maler at forgerock.com>>; dg-bsc at kantarainitiative.org <mailto:dg-bsc at kantarainitiative.org>
> Subject: Re: [DG-BSC] Ann Vroom Followup toBSC telecon Thursday August 25 2016
> 
>  
> Excellent!  I'll do a minimal sketch of this flow.
> 
>  
> On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 4:02 PM, M AV <av_m at hotmail.com <mailto:av_m at hotmail.com>> wrote:
> 
> Hi – in reference to this afternoon’s conf call, here’s my super-simplified version of the flow I described:
> 
> <Mail Attachment.jpeg>
> 
> 
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